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ABSTRACT 
In order to successfully decontaminate, deactivate and decommission surplus Department of 
Energy (DOE) facilities throughout the Savannah River Site (SRS), a variety of characterizations 
must be completed to sufficiently identify and quantify potential contaminants of concern.  The 
ultimate goal is to rapidly and efficiently characterize, decontaminate (if necessary), and verify 
that the remnants meet specified limits established by either an industrial worker model or a 
groundwater model.  To meet this end, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) 
developed a series of radioanalytical strategies and methodologies which can be used to 
characterize targeted facilities and prove that decontamination has been sufficient.   
 
To our knowledge, this is the first application of this novel methodology within the DOE 
complex.  This methodology has been successfully utilized with nearly 1000 samples from over 
a dozen facilities.  The application of this approach to just a single facility shortened the schedule 
by 30 days and resulted in non-labor dollar savings of over $60K.  Cost savings for a second 
facility was determined to be $375K.  Based on the success of this methodology at SRS, this 
approach will be valuable to other nuclear facilities in the USA and abroad involved with the 
decontamination and decommissioning process. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, a large degree of focus has been placed on the decontamination, deactivation, 
and decommissioning of inactive facilities throughout the Savannah River Site Nuclear 
Complex.  The process of decommissioning facilities involves removal actions which are 
supported throughout numerous stages by radiological characterization of the material slated for 
removal, and confirmatory analyses of material which is to be left in place.  The process is 
generally tied to very aggressive schedules. 
 
The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) can rigorously quantify the possible 
radiological contaminants of concern (COCs) encountered in Site facilities utilizing 
radiochemical separations and analyses; however, these analyses can be costly and time-
consuming.  Therefore, it was necessary to develop a faster, cheaper, accurate, and technically 
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defensible approach for the analysis of concrete powder samples with wide ranges of 
contamination levels and varying constituents.  In response to this challenge, a “bounding” 
approach was designed to characterize the samples to a level at or below the level defined by the 
acceptable risk-thus proving that the facility of interest has been fully characterized and 
successfully decontaminated.  
 
The utilization of this approach employs a unique process in which: 
• a list of radionuclides requiring evaluation is optimized,  
• the Derived Concentration Guideline Levels (DCGLs) in an SRNL  Technical Guidance 
Document are utilized to determine target detection levels for the radionuclides requiring 
evaluation,  
• a staged analysis approach is developed to quantify the radionuclides to the target 
detection levels, and  
• necessary analyses are carried out to sufficiently provide empirical data in a time-and 
cost-efficient manner. 
 
This paper will provide in-depth details on the successful application of this “bounding” 
approach. 
 
OPTIMIZATION OF RADIONUCLIDES TO BE QUANTIFIED 
At the onset of work for a given facility, Site Deactivation and Decommissioning (SDD) and 
SRNL personnel generate a list of contaminants of concern (COCs) for the facility.  This requires 
knowledge of the facility’s historical missions and details of the processes utilized to accomplish 
those missions (i.e., process knowledge).  Some facilities had limited missions and highly 
controlled processes, so the associated process knowledge is well defined and easily obtained.  
However, some facilities had missions dating to the 1950s, and/or missions that changed many 
times throughout the life of the facility.  In these instances, process knowledge alone is not 
complete enough to formulate a rigorous understanding of possible COCs.  
 
Regardless of the extent of available process knowledge, it serves as the starting point to 
generate an initial list of COCs.  Sampling evolutions from areas which are known to be or are 
most likely to be contaminated (spill areas, secondary containments, sumps, pits, and the like) 
are then performed.  Samples from these evolutions are exhaustively analyzed for a complete 
spectrum of potential isotopes.  The resultant analytical data, coupled with the process 
knowledge, are used to finalize the list of COCs.  Table I provides an example of a COC list 
utilized for a recent facility. 
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Table I.  Example of a Typical List of Contaminants of Concern 
Tritium I-129 U-238 
C-14 Cs-137 Pu-238 
Ni-59 U-233 Pu-239 
Co-60 U-234 Pu-240 
Ni-63 U-235 Am-241 
Sr-90 U-236 Pu-242 
Tc-99 Np-237 Cm-242 
 
 
DETERMINATION OF TARGET DETECTION LEVELS 
Nuclides on this list of COCs are required to be quantified in concrete which has been 
statistically sampled from the facility.  The quantification process is used to prove that the 
maximum allowable contamination at the Savannah River Site (SRS) has not been exceeded.  
For the SRS, detection levels for radionuclides included on the list of COCs are determined using 
Derived Concentration Guideline Levels (DCGLs) from SRS Technical Guidance Document 
WSRC-TR-2003-00448.  This Technical Guidance Document utilizes risk modeling for both the 
industrial worker and impact to groundwater as required by the contract specific clean-up 
criteria.  It reports both radionuclide-specific Industrial Worker DCGLs determined using 
RESRAD (Residual Radioactivity) to identify the 1.0E-04 risk to the industrial worker and area 
specific Groundwater Impact DCGLs determined using VZCOMML (Vadose Zone 
Contamination Model Multi-Layer) to identify contaminants likely to pose a threat to 
groundwater in 1000 years.  In simplistic terms, the process involves a limit that is associated 
with risk.  Quantified risk below the limit is acceptable, quantified risk above the limit is not 
acceptable.  
 
Table II illustrates the radionuclides to be quantified per Table I and the level to which the 
quantification is required based on the DCGLs.  The target detection levels utilized for analysis 
planning are the most restrictive of the following two limits: area specific groundwater impact 
DCGLs derived from VZCOMML or 10% of the 1E-04 industrial worker risk derived from 
RESRAD.  The 10% is a result of industrial risk values being cumulative; the sum of the 
DCGL/actual result must be less than 1; or the total can not be greater than 100%.  The 
groundwater limit is not cumulative; if radionuclides are quantified below the limit they meet the 
criteria for acceptable risk.  Any radionuclide quantified above the groundwater limit does not 
meet the criteria for acceptable risk, or fails. 
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Table II. Example of Radionuclides to be Quantified and Their Target Detection Levels 
Radionuclide 
Target Detection Levels 
0.1x1E-04 Risk Industrial 
Worker DCGL (pCi/g) 
Target Detection Levels 
Area VZCOMML 
Groundwater  
DCGL (pCi/g) 
H-3 6.94E+07 6.41E+03 
C-14 1.90E+07  
Ni-59 3.73E+06  
Ni-63 1.65E+06  
Co-60 1.12E+00  
Sr-90 4.31E+03  
Y-90 4.31E+03  
Tc-99 7.18E+05 8.65E+02 
I-129 4.17E+03 9.60E-01 
Cs-137 3.18E+00  
U-233 9.74E+02  
U-234 2.83E+03  
U-235 5.35E+00  
U-236 3.54E+03  
U-238 3.02E+01  
Np-237 4.03E+00  
Pu-238 1.62E+03  
Pu-239 1.38E+03  
Pu-240 1.46E+03  
Pu-242 1.55E+03  
Am-241 7.58E+01  
Cm-242 3.31E+03  
 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF ANALYSIS STRATEGY 
Once the target detection levels are determined, a series of analyses are designed to meet the 
target detection levels for all of the nuclides in Table II.  Often, many of the target detection 
levels are quite low, so rigorous radiochemical separations and analyses are required to 
sufficiently quantify these particular nuclides.  However, many of the target detection levels are 
often high enough to negate the need for rigorous separations and analyses.  In these cases, gross 
analyses are utilized to provide initial quantification.  If the gross results are below the target 
detection limits, no further analyses are required.  If the gross results are above the target 
detection limits, further analyses are selectively targeted based upon the gross results.  
 
In short, a combination of nuclide-specific analyses coupled with gross analyses can be utilized 
to support SDD customers throughout many stages of their work to determine whether 
acceptable risk levels have been met.  These analyses are carried out in a staged approach, which 
is clarified in the following sections.  The COCs and target detection levels listed in Table II will 
be used as the skeleton of the outline.  It should be noted that each stage of analyses is 
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customized for the specific facility undergoing the D&D process, which carries with it unique 
COCs and DCGLs.  The details are customized to meet the requirements of each specific facility; 
however, the overall process is similar for all facilities at SRS. 
 
STAGE 1 ANALYSES 
Initially, concrete samples submitted to Savannah River National Laboratory in support of this 
type of work are analyzed using a combination of the following methods: tritium distillation 
followed by liquid scintillation analysis, I-129 separation followed by low energy gamma pulse 
height analysis, gamma pulse height analysis using high purity germanium detectors, Ni-59 via 
low energy gamma pulse height analysis, gross alpha analysis, gross nonvolatile beta analysis, 
and gross total beta analysis.  These seven analyses are utilized for the COCs in Table II as 
illustrated in Table III.  
 
Table III. Stage 1 Analyses in Support of Table II Radionuclides  
Radionuclide Source 
Tritium Tritium Separation and Analysis 
C-14 Gross Total Beta Analysis 
Ni-59 Ni-59 via Gamma Pulse Height Analysis 
Co-60 Gamma Pulse Height Analysis 
Ni-63 Gross Total Beta Analysis 
Sr-90 Gross Nonvolatile Beta Analysis 
Tc-99 Gross Total Beta Analysis 
I-129 I-129 Separation and Analysis 
Cs-137 Gamma Pulse Height Analysis 
U-233 Gross Alpha Analysis 
U-234 Gross Alpha Analysis 
U-235 Gamma Pulse Height Analysis 
U-236 Gross Alpha Analysis 
Np-237 Gamma Pulse Height Analysis 
U-238 Gross Alpha Analysis 
Pu-238 Gross Alpha Analysis 
Pu-239 Gross Alpha Analysis 
Pu-240 Gross Alpha Analysis 
Am-241 Gamma Pulse Height Analysis 
Pu-242 Gross Alpha Analysis 
Cm-242 Gross Alpha Analysis 
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Specific information pertaining to the application of each method to the characterization of 
concrete samples follows. 
Tritium 
The tritium analysis involves a separation via distillation followed by liquid scintillation 
analysis.  The DCGL-based target detection level from Table II is utilized to plan the analysis 
and the associated analysis detection limit.  The relatively low target detection level in Table II 
necessitates the rigorous radiochemical separation and analysis for this nuclide. 
I-129 Separation and Analysis 
The low energy of the I-129 gamma emission, in addition to the low targeted detection level 
required by this example, necessitates a rigorous radiochemical separation and analysis for this 
nuclide.  The I-129 separation and analysis involves a silver iodide precipitation followed by low 
energy gamma analysis.  Neutron activation analysis is used to yield the separation.  
Gamma Pulse Height Analysis 
The gamma pulse height analysis using an n-type high purity germanium detector provides the 
ability to quantify:  Co-60, Cs-137, U-235, Np-237, Am-241, Am-243 via the Np-239 daughter, 
Cm-243, Cm-244, U-235, U-238 if low detection limits are not needed, Ac-228, Sb-124, Sb-125, 
Ba-133, Bi-212, Bi-214, Cf-249, Cf-251, Ce-141, Ce-144, Cs-134, Cs-137, Co-57, Co-58,  
Co-60, Eu-152, Eu-154, Eu-155, Pb-212, Mn-54, Np-239, Nb-94, K-40, Pm-144, Pm-146,  
Ru-103, Ru-106, Na-22, Tl-208, Sn-113, Sn-116, Y-88, Y-90, Zn-65, and Zr-95.   
 
This is not an exhaustive list, and there are many other ways to quantify some of these listed 
isotopes.  The DCGL-based target detection levels from Table II are utilized to plan the analysis 
and the associated method detection limit.  All observed nuclides deemed to be present above the 
lower level of detection are reported.  Results below the lower limit of detection are not reported 
for isotopes unless they are listed as COCs.  
Ni-59 Analysis 
Ni-59, which undergoes electron capture, is detectable via low energy gamma pulse height 
analysis.  The DCGL-based target detection level from Table II is utilized to plan the analysis 
and the associated method detection limit.  Due to the large magnitude of the target detection 
limit in this example, no radiochemical separation was deemed necessary for this nuclide prior to 
low energy gamma pulse height analysis.  Bypassing the unnecessary radiochemical separation, 
when possible, increases the efficiency of the characterization analyses. 
Gross Alpha Analysis 
The gross alpha analysis provides total, non-speciated alpha activity-it is not isotope specific.  
This total alpha activity can be used to provide an upper limit for the following alpha-emitting 
nuclides in this example: U-233, U-234, U-236, U-238, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu242, and 
Cm-242.  For this example, the DCGL-based target detection level for U-238 would be utilized 
to plan the analysis and the associated method detection limit, since it is the most restrictive of 
the listed alpha-emitting nuclides.  The total reported alpha activity represents the maximum 
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level for the combination of all the isotopes listed in this paragraph.  If the reported gross alpha 
measurement is above the target detection level for any of the listed alpha-emitting nuclides, 
further Stage 2 analyses would be carried out as described later in this paper.  No further 
analyses would be required for any of the isotopes for which the reported gross alpha 
measurement is below the target detection level.  Bypassing any unnecessary radiochemical 
separations increases the efficiency of the characterization analyses. 
Gross Total Beta Analysis 
The gross total beta analysis provides total, non-speciated beta activity-it is not isotope specific.  
This total beta activity is used to provide an upper limit for the following beta-emitting nuclides 
in this example: C-14, Ni-63, and Tc-99.  For this example, the DCGL-based target detection 
level for Tc-99 would be utilized to plan the analysis and the associated method detection limit, 
since it is the most restrictive of the listed beta-emitting nuclides.  The total beta activity 
represents the maximum level for the combination of all the isotopes listed in this paragraph.   
If the reported gross total beta measurement is above the target detection level for any of the 
listed beta-emitting nuclides, further Stage 2 analyses would be carried out as described later in 
this paper.  No further analyses would be required for any of the isotopes for which the reported 
gross total beta measurement is below the target detection level.  Bypassing any unnecessary 
radiochemical separations increases the efficiency of the characterization analyses. 
Gross Nonvolatile Beta Analysis 
The gross nonvolatile beta analysis provides total, non-speciated beta activity- it is not isotope 
specific.  This total nonvolatile beta activity is used to provide an upper limit for the following 
beta-emitting nuclides in this example: Sr-90 and Y-90.  The DCGL-based target detection levels 
from Table II are utilized to plan the analysis and the associated method detection limit.  For this 
example, the target detection levels for Sr-90 and Y-90 were much lower than those for the other 
beta-emitting nuclides, so some pretreatment would be required to concentrate the sample 
matrix.  This pretreatment would remove volatile beta constituents.  This volatilization, coupled 
with the target detection levels, provides the justification for analyzing for both total beta activity 
and nonvolatile beta activity.  The total nonvolatile beta activity represents the maximum level 
for the combination of all the isotopes listed in this paragraph.  If the reported gross nonvolatile 
beta measurement is above the target detection level for Sr-90 or Y-90, further Stage 2 analyses 
would be carried out as described later in this paper.  Bypassing the unnecessary radiochemical 
separation, when possible, increases the efficiency of the characterization analyses. 
 
STAGE 2 ANALYSES 
If the Stage 1 results for all applicable COCs are proven to be below the risk-related target 
detection levels, no further analyses are required.  However, if a nuclide is quantified via a gross 
method, and the gross result is above the target detection level, follow-up is required utilizing the 
more rigorous radiochemical separation and analysis.  The rigorous radiochemical separations 
and analyses are performed only when necessary; consequently, the overall analysis cost is 
reduced and the schedule is accelerated.   
 
Provided the activity levels in the samples are low enough, the Stage 1 analyses can successfully 
complete the entire characterization outlined in Table II.  Stage 2 analyses are utilized, as 
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previously mentioned, in cases in which the gross analyses provide results above the targeted 
detection levels.  When a gross result is above the target detection level for any specific nuclide, 
a more rigorous radiochemical separation and analysis is carried out for that nuclide.  This is 
accomplished using any number of the following methods: Tc-99 separation and analysis, C-14 
separation and analysis, Ni-59/Ni-63 separation and analysis, Sr-90 separation and analysis,  
ICP-MS, plutonium separation and analysis, or americium/curium separation and analysis.  
These radiochemical separations, which are complex and time-consuming, utilize a large portion 
of the laboratory’s resources.  Bypassing these involved methods, when possible, greatly 
increases the efficiency and economy of the characterization analyses without negatively 
impacting the data quality provided for the SDD customer. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This staged approach enables technically defensible rapid characterization of a large number of 
samples in a relatively short amount of time.  It has been successfully utilized to determine 
whether risk criteria have been met with nearly 1000 samples from over a dozen facilities.  The 
application of this approach to just a single facility shortened the schedule by 30 days and 
resulted in non-labor dollar savings of over $60K.  Cost savings for a second facility was 
determined to be $375K.  Based on the success of this methodology at SRS, this approach will 
be valuable to other nuclear facilities in the USA and abroad involved with the decontamination 
and decommissioning process. 
 
 
 
 
